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Abstract
Ten years ago, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)1 attempted to repair the
damage done by the financial crisis and hence required the most
substantial changes to business operations and periodic reporting2
in the American financial services industry since the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.3 The author had the privilege of commenting
on several aspects of the legislation as proposed4 and has continued
to discuss the intent, implementation, and modification of DoddFrank’s provisions and related rulemaking in the decade since
2009.5 This Article centers on Section 953(b)’s reporting burden and
* Lecturer in Economics, Organizational Behavior, Public Policy, and
Statistics at Northwestern University and Lecturer in Law at Northwestern
University’s Pritzker School of Law. Thanks to Luis A. Aguilar (Commissioner,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) for being receptive to my input on
these matters as 953(b) took shape and for citing my comments, even where we
have disagreed. I have enjoyed my work with regulators on these matters and
hope we can continue this dialogue and build a more workable framework where
investors are well-informed while American firms are positioned for continued
success. Special thanks to my friends Andrew Leventhal and Griffin Myers.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
2. “Given the depth of the financial crisis, it took a massive response by our
government to keep it from turning into a new Great Depression. And it is not
surprising that it resulted in a hefty piece of legislation – the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – which covered a vast array of
topics in its 540 sections.” Rick A. Fleming, Keynote Address at the University
of Maryland: Examining the Dodd-Frank Act and the Future of Financial
Regulation (Nov. 16, 2016), www.sec.gov/news/speech/fleming-speech-keynoteaddress-111616.html.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa-78pp (2018).
4. E.g., Karl T. Muth, Comment, Comments on Proposed Rule: Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, SEC (Jan. 26, 2011), www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-04-11/s70411.shtml [hereinafter No. S7-04-11] (File No. S7-04-11).
5. E.g., Karl T. Muth, Comment, Comments on Proposed Rule: Family
Offices, SEC (Nov. 2, 2010), www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-10/s72510-5.pdf (File
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how it has affected companies, how it has informed shareholders
and non-shareholders, and the degree of public interest in Section
953(b) disclosures.
Pay ratios are now headline news because of a controversial provision
in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, passed in the wake of the financial crisis.
It requires publicly traded companies to report their median
employee pay ($46,127 in Disney’s case) and calculate the CEO pay
ratio. Since mandatory reporting began last year, these ratios have
captured public attention in ways that the typically technical
corporate disclosure documents never do.6

Written in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, during which
many CEOs are taking pay cuts or foregoing bonuses, the author
has chosen to focus on pre-crisis market conditions, which are
better-understood and likely more representative of normal wage
dynamics for executives. Executive compensation, and particularly
chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, has been an issue
receiving substantial political and media attention in recent years7
– a phenomenon not unrelated to Section 953(b)’s intents and
contents. For context, from 1978 to 2018, the S&P500 index rose
706.7% while CEO compensation grew 1,007.5%.8

No. S7-25-10); No. S7-04-11, supra note 4; Karl T. Muth, Comment, Comments
on Proposed Rule: Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, SEC (Apr. 9,
2011), www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-11/s71211-6.pdf (File No. S7-12-11); Karl
T. Muth, Comments on Proposed Rule: Pay Ratio Disclosure, SEC (Sep. 24,
2013) (File No. S7-07-13); Karl T. Muth, Comments on Proposed Rule:
Disclosure of Payments by Resource of Extraction Issuers, SEC (Mar. 27, 2016),
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-15/s72515-65.htm (File No. S7-25-15); Karl T.
Muth, Comments on Proposed Rule: Definition of “Covered Clearing Agency”,
SEC (Nov. 20, 2016), www.sec.gov/comments/s7-23-16/s72316-5.htm (File No.
S7-23-16); Karl T. Muth, Comments on Proposed Rule: Covered Securities
Pursuant to Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, SEC (July 21, 2017),
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-17/s70617-156841.htm (File No. S7-06-17); Karl
T. Muth, Comments on Proposed Rule: Reporting Threshold for Institutional
Investment Managers, SEC (July 16, 2020), www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0820/s70820-220167.htm (File No. S7-08-20).
6. Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Rage over Bob Iger’s Payday Masks
How Little We Know About Income Gaps in America, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 2019),
www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-bank-georgiev-bob-iger-ceo-pay-ratiodisney-20190503-story. html.
7. Mark J. Perry & Michael Saltsman, About That CEO/Employee Pay Gap,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/mark-perry-and-michaelsaltsman-about-that-ceo-employee-pay-gap-1413150999 (discussing at length
this controversy journalists, armed with readily-available Section 953(b)
executive compensation reports for publicly-traded companies, have stoked).
8. Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940%
Since
1978,
ECON.
POL’Y
INST.
(Aug.
14,
2019),
www.epi.org/files/pdf/171191.pdf; see also id. (detailing how CEO compensation
growth was also 940.3% under the options-realized measure).
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INTRODUCTION

Dodd-Frank is composed of thousands of provisions,9 many of
which enhance reporting in an attempt to give both regulators and
shareholders increased situational awareness as to firms’ financial
health, operational practices, and risk-taking behaviors.10 Several
provisions involve increased reporting surrounding human
resources or compensation practices at the firm level,11 and one of
these includes disclosure of the ratio between the Chief Executive
Officer’s pay and the pay of the median employee12 In some cases,
the median employee may make more money than the Chief
Executive Officer– though the CEO’s total compensation, including
eventual appreciation of stock options and or equity compensation,
may be vastly larger over time. But, among Fortune 500 firms, these
firms are a tiny minority and are nearly all high technology firms;13
in the vast majority of cases, the ratio 𝑋/𝑌, where X is CEO pay,14
and Y is median employee pay,15 far exceeds unity.
9. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1 (containing over 9,200 provisions, rules
adjustments, administrative process alterations, and reporting requirements
and over 300 rules or processes eliminated or consolidated).
10. Discussion Draft of Dodd-Frank, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009), www.
llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/frank-treasury-discussion-draft_2009-1027.pdf (contemplating already those three categories of regulatory concern).
11. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay
Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160. html
(implementing rule as amended, reviewed, and approved by SEC
Commissioners in prior months).
12. See 17 CFR § 229.402 (2015) (describing and specifying ratio).
13. See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at
47 (Apr. 27, 2018), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/0001308179
18000222/lgoog2018-def14a.htm (exhibiting how Google CEO Larry Page, who
was already worth more than forty billion dollars and stated that additional
executive pay was not an appropriate motivating factor, was compensated a
dollar in 2017); Facebook, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF-14A), at
28 (Apr. 10, 2020), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/0001326801
20000037/facebook2020definitiveprox.htm. But cf. Alphabet, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 49 (Apr. 24, 2020),
www.sec.report/Document/0001308179-20-000203 (exhibiting how CEO Page’s
successor in Sundar Pichai received a $242 million pay package less than two
years later).
14. According to publicly available filings thus far in 2020, only a singledigit number of S&P500 firms have CEOs paid less than the firm’s median
employee. This result is consistent with a study in 2018 of the five hundred
S&P500 firms, which found two paying their CEOs less than the median
employee. Sarah Berger, From Bob Iger to Warren Buffett and Jack Dorsey:
These are the Highest and Lowest Paid CEOs of 2018, CNBC, www.cnbc.com/
2019/05/16/wsj-report-highest-and-lowest-paid-sp-500-ceos-in-2018.html (last
updated May 16, 2019).
15. The concept of a pay ratio disclosure arose early in the debate of DoddFrank, but its practical discussion and implementation planning did not come
until five years later in the 114th Congress; its first mention explicitly actually
came in an amendment meant to block pay ratio reporting. See 162 CONG. REC.
H4510 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (House Amendment 1254) (amending Financial
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All firms required to make disclosures under Section 953(b)
are also required to make compensation disclosures under Item
402(c)(2)(x).16 The executive compensation and pay ratio aspect of
this disclosure began in 2017 or with the first fiscal year beginning
after January 1, 2017.17 Firms are required to make the disclosure
no later than the 120th day following the close of the fiscal year for
which reporting must occur.18 Firms may identify the median
employee utilized as the ratio’s denominator by a “reasonable”
method.19 For instance, choosing the middle employee in terms of
“[a]nnual total compensation as determined under existing
executive compensation rules” or according to “[a]ny consistentlyapplied compensation measure from compensation amounts
reported in its payroll or tax records.”20 This is substantially
identical to the rules for calculating sums provided in director
compensation disclosures21 and not wholly dissimilar from how
executive pay sums are typically calculated in periodic
communications between publicly-traded corporations and their
shareholders.22
For this reason, the design of the disclosure itself demands and
receives substantial attention at some firms, especially those often
scrutinized for executive pay practices by shareholders or by the
media.23

II. THE DISCLOSURE’S DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The origins of the Section 953(b) pay ratio disclosure do not
evidence in early drafts of Dodd-Frank. In fact, the early drafts of
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 5485, 114th Cong.
(2017)); id. (statement of Rep. Huizenga). A later version of the provision
eventually was integrated into Dodd-Frank as Section 953(b).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 229, 249 (2015) (incorporating a variety of comments from
when it was a proposed rule).
17. Press Release, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. David Polk & Wardwell LLP, SEC’s Latest Guidance on Pay Ratio Rule,
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sep. 26, 2017),
www.corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/26/secs-latest-guidance-on-pay-ratiorule/ (explaining how business associations have flexibility in determining those
methodologies).
20. Press Release, supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Boeing Co., Notice of 2017 Annual Meeting & Proxy Statement
40 (Mar. 17, 2017), www.s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual
/2016/Boeing-2017-Proxy-Statement.pdf (including proxy statement language
along with CEO pay for the most recent three years); see also Table A infra.
22. E.g, id.; Table B infra.
23. See Nina Trentmann & Kristin Broughton, Companies That Don’t Cut
Executive Pay Now Could Pay for it Later, WALL ST. J. (April 21. 2020),
www.wsj.com/articles/companies-that-dont-cut-executive-pay-now-could-payfor-it-later-11587477361 (“At a time when many investors are putting greater
emphasis on environmental, social and governance considerations, perceived
missteps could do companies more damage than in the past.”).
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additional disclosure provisions did not feature any discussion of
CEO pay. Instead, Section 953(b) traces its roots to language
considered by the drafters of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP),24 which came into being25 as part of debates (which
stretched on for years26) surrounding the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 200827 which, in turn, modified other parts of
the financial system’s scaffolding.28 In October of 2008, the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) created both
enhanced reporting and “hard ceiling” limits on executive
compensation at firms assisted by the federal government through
its TARP program.29
Through that program,30 executive compensation at firms was
24. 154 CONG. REC. S10515-597 (Oct. 14, 2008).
25. Procedurally, see appendix and unnumbered pages to the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-61 (2018)).
26. See H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008). See generally debate on Dodd-Frank,
supra note 1, §§ 951-57 (subtit. E, tit. IX); Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 16, 2010),
www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executivecompensation/executivecompensation-51.pdf.
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see H.R. 1424 (having been
amended by multiple Committees of the House of Representatives, having been
referred to the Senate as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
with no substantive deviations from H.R. 1424, and having been bi-camerally
reconciled substantially on October 2, 2008, with full reconciliation of language
occurring in the House in a largely-ceremonial meeting at 27 Independence Ave.
S.E. on the morning of October 3, 2008). Because the bill technically was a tax
bill, procedural rules did not permit it to originate from the Senate; hence, H.R.
1424 is a House Resolution originating from the House Finance Committee,
despite its already having traveled to the Senate for debate, markup, and
substantial revision. Barney Frank (a member of the House of Representatives,
not the Senate) is its author of record. Though H.R. 1424 (as amended) is very
different from H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (which Frank originally
introduced), they are considered close relatives in the same legislative lineage,
and the bill signed by President Bush and enacted October 3, 2008, bore an
introductory chapeau typed on U.S. House of Representatives letterhead.
28. See, e.g., amendments to Section 203 of the Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 12 U.S.C. 461, and an increase of FDIC deposit
insurance limits from $100,000 to $250,000, this being the first meaningful
adjustment of FDIC limits in decades; see also contemporaneous proposed
amendments in early 2010, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S3007 (Apr. 30, 2010) (Murray
Amendment),www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/bill-111th_s3217amdts_april30-may19.pdf. Compare amendments to FDIC Insurance
Provisions within Dobb-Frank and separately-but-identially codified at Pub. L.
No. 111-203 (substantively identical adjustment).
29. An annual limit of $500,000 was placed on CEO pay for TARP
beneficiary firms. See also David Weidner, Banks Kick the TARP Habit, but
Keep Another Vice, WALL ST. J., www.wsj.com/articles/SB124223172335815695
(last updated May 14, 2009) (suggesting TARP firms rushed to pay back
government loans in order to resume paying higher, pre-crisis levels of CEO
pay).
30. Troubled Asset Relief Program, tit. I, 122 Stat. at 3767-900 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § § 5211-41) [hereinafter TARP]; see also id. at 3771
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monitored and policed by the Financial Stability Oversight Board
(FSOB).31 Executive compensation practices were tied to corporate
governance monitoring.32 This is despite then-recent evidence that
CEOs receiving more generous pay tended to lead firms with better
corporate performance and tended to return more value to
shareholders more quickly.33 Little, if any, contemporary evidence
suggested that high levels of CEO pay were either indicative of, or
the result of, poor corporate governance practices.34 Even with
administrative meddling, the majority of TARP firms were able to
retain their chief executives, and essentially all TARP funds were
repaid ahead-of-schedule and in amounts that accounted for interim
inflation.35

III. USE BY CONGRESS AND REGULATORS IN RELATION TO
TARP FIRMS
The reporting required by Section 953(b) is very similar in
format and content to the reporting required by the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act.36 In that context, periodic
(quarterly, barring extraordinary events) reporting was sent to the
FSOB.37 Some of the context for this reporting was shared with the
public through draft bills38 and “fact sheets” prepared for the
public,39 but discussions or transcripts of discussions were not
(making substantial modifications by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2018)).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 5214 (2020).
32. § 111, 122 Stat. at 3776-77.
33. Rachel Merhebi et al., Australian Chief Executive Officer Remuneration:
Pay and Performance, 46 ACCT. & FIN. 481 (2006).
34. Though perhaps counterintuitive to liberal journalists and activist
shareholders, the relationship between high executive pay and bad governance
practices is not proven and may not even be a strong correlation. See Charles
M. Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.
2003, at 68, www.hbr.org/2003/01/whats-wrong-with-executive-compensation
(discussing grounding principles and persistent questions in this area that have
changed little since the financial crisis).
35. Ryan Tracy et al., Bank Bailouts Approach a Final Reckoning, WALL ST.
J., www.wsj.com/articles/ally-financial-exits-tarp-as-treasury-sells-remainingstake-1419000430 (last updated Dec. 19, 2014) (asserting that most firms exited
TARP with similar stories); Table B infra.
36. Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. VII, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C) (Section 7001 of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act amended Section 111 of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act). Not to be confused with the materiallydifferent and more comprehensive reporting contemplated in Section 11.1 of
H.R. 1424.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 5214 (2020).
38. Discussion Draft of Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009,
S. 3217, 111th Cong., www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/bill-111th-s3217discussion-draft.pdf. This draft was circulated publicly by the Congressional
Budget Office and the United States Government Publishing Office.
39. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, U.S. Treasury Department
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generally released in full.40 As pressure from the public and from
the newspapers grew during 2009, more information was released
via FSOB in monthly reports on TARP, many of which were
communicated through the White House or through press
conferences hosted by President Obama, individuals representing
the Department of the Treasury, or relevant offices within the
Federal Reserve (Fed).41
As executive compensation in corporate America increased
post-1978, and as this increase accelerated after the 1987 stock
market crash,42 the basis of these pay increases came under
question among shareholders, journalists, and the general public –
particularly to the extent these increases seemed either
unwarranted or untethered from firm-level performance.43 The
public perception in some circles was that CEO total realized
compensation reached unreasonably high levels in part due to a
collusive relationship between the CEO and the board of directors.44
The compensation committee of the board of directors typically
determines the executive salaries in negotiations that may not be
as adversarial or “arms length” as some shareholders and theoryof-the-firm folks would like.45
In the financial crisis of 2008, when the United States
Government bailed out the “too big to fail” banks,46 these questions
were elevated47 from boardroom grumblings to front-page news,
particularly in the financial sector (construed broadly to include
banks, investment banks, and insurers).48 Populist sentiment

Releases Financial Regulatory Reform (Jun. 17, 2009), www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/20096171052487309.aspx.
40. No transcript of the final Senate closed hearing on the topic, for instance,
has ever been released. See 156 CONG. REC. S5870-933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010)
(providing missing document).
41. The Department of the Treasury now maintains the archive of these
monthly reports, which are still updated every month in which TARP funds are
still used or owed. See Monthly Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Mon
thly-Report-to-Congress.aspx (providing full archive of reports in PDF form).
42. See generally Mishel & Wolfe, supra note 8 (describing rate and scale of
CEO pay increases).
43. Id. at 9 Fig. A.
44. This has been studied in depth in the context of Harvard Law School’s
Forum on Corporate Governance. Stephani A. Mason et al., Say-on-Pay: Is
Anybody Listening?, 20 MULTINATIONAL FIN. J. 273 (July 11, 2017), www.
ssrn.com/abstract=2826640 (2016).
45. Id. at 1-9; see also Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, CEO
Compensation and Board Oversight, 64 J. FIN. 231 (2009) (describing complex
mix of collaborative and adversarial negotiation conditions).
46. Eric Dash, If It’s Too Big to Fail, Is It Too Big to Exist?, N.Y. TIMES (Jun.
20, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21dash.html.
47. Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note 45, at 235-40.
48. Of the $700B allocated for TARP, some funds were also set aside for the
American auto industry. See Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
Information, FED. RES. BD. OF GOVERNORS, www.federalreserve.gov/superv
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against the large salaries and bonuses of bank executives spread
onto the editorial pages of many major newspapers for a decade.49
Some vocal critics believed that the use of taxpayer bailout money
to pay large salaries was unconscionable during a time of high
unemployment and firm underperformance.50 It did not take long
for these loud voices and newspaper clippings to reach Capitol Hill,
where they influenced the questions and policies posed and
proposed by legislators there.
While turnover among regulators and administrators of the
economy between 2008 and 2010 was very low,51 some TARP firms
experienced executive turnover. For example, Eric Feldstein did not
appear on GMAC LLC’s (GMAC) website as CEO of GMAC until
substantially after he appeared in the 2007 10-K filing as CEO, even
though one could consider Feldstein as GMAC CEO for 2007;
similarly, Alvaro de Molina’s ascension announcement via press
release from GMAC was not on the same date as the date on the
supplement to the 10-K filing (later filed at exhibit 99 of the 2008
8-K Form).52 Despite these irregularities in the dataset, one can
reasonably determine who was CEO for most of each company’s
fiscal year, and there were no reporting issues around CEO pay
during the administration of TARP so severe as to invite
enforcement action.53 In fact, in every case, the institution receiving
isionreg/tarpinfo.htm (last updated Mar. 7, 2017) (providing additional general
information about the program).
49. See, e.g., Bank & Georgiev, supra note 6; David Gelles, Six C.E.O. Pay
Packages that Explain Soaring Executive Compensation, N. Y. TIMES (May 25,
2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/top-ceo-pay-packages.html.
50. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Fixing Bankers’ Pay, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Nov.
2009, at 1, www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/opeds/11-09-EconVoice.pdf;
Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1222-25 (2011).
51. Jon Hilsenrath, Economists Back Bernanke Reappointment, WALL ST. J.,
(Nov. 13, 2008), www.online.wsj.com/article/SB122660195494825105.html. But
Bernanke’s reappointment was not without opposition: Boxer, Brownback,
Cantwell, Cornyn, Crapo, DeMint, Dorgan, Ensign, Feingold, Grassley, Harkin,
Hutchinson, Inhofe, McCain, Roberts, Sessions, Shelby, Specter, Thune, and
Vitter all voted against Bernanke’s confirmation. Contemporaneously, Rep. Ron
Paul introduced H.R. 1207 to audit the Federal Reserve (Fed), arguably his
career’s trademark piece of (failed) legislation. The appointment of Mary Jo
White to Chair the SEC in 2013 was the first major post-crisis appointment of
a financial markets regulatory agency. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Econ. Club of N.Y.: The SEC After the Financial
Crisis: Protecting Investors, Preserving Markets (Jan. 17, 2017), www.sec.gov/
news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-crisis.html (recounting some of White’s
thoughts on the crisis and the SEC’s role four years later).
52. Compare GMAC LLC, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 153 (Mar. 18,
2008), www.sec.report/Document/0000950124-08-001297, with GMAC LLC,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) exh. 99 (Feb. 26, 2010), www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1467858/000119312510078119/dex99.htm (providing the newest
version of the 8-K filing, now known as the 10-K filing).
53. No actions brought in administrative contexts, by the SEC, or by USA
SDNY with failure to disclose or failure to adhere causes of action against TARP
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support under TARP reported in a timely and accurate manner its
executive pay practices and the total amount of compensation the
chief executive received; there were zero instances in which either
the FSOB or others involved in administering TARP objected to
either the formula used to calculate the amount of CEO pay54 or the
timeliness of the reporting of a firm’s CEO pay.

IV. THE USE OF DISCLOSURES’ USE ACROSS SECTORS OR
INDUSTRIES
Taking the executive pay reporting structure utilized in the
FSOB or TARP context and imposing it on all publicly-traded
companies is not as simple as it may sound or seem. This is in part
because the enhanced monitoring of TARP has a different and
compelling justification:55 These firms were operating and investing
using the People’s money (in the uppercase “We the People” sense),
not simply investors’ risk capital, which the Treasury Department
contended meant high-resolution was appropriate.56 Firms are
already subject to heightened scrutiny by virtue of being publiclytraded on regulated United States exchanges.57
Is increased babysitting and reporting beyond this alreadyheightened standard really justified beyond these few TARP firms?
“No evidence whatsoever indicates that errant executive
compensation 'caused' the financial crisis of 2008, or that its
reduction would prevent similar events in the future. The recent
scrutiny of executive pay seems to stem from an odd mix of envy
and vengeance, unsupported by facts or theories.”58 Similarly,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz find “there is no evidence that banks with
CEOs whose incentives were less well aligned with the interests of

firms during this time related to TARP compliance.
54. The only reasonableness-of-compensation discussions occurring at
FSOB publicly involved Peter Kraus having been promised a $25 million
“goodbye bonus” at the conclusion of his tenure at AllianceBernstein, LP.
55. David Yermack, Keeping the Pay Police at Bay, WALL ST. J.,
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703746604574461462598126406
(last updated Oct. 10, 2009).
56. TARP is the only government program where the Treasury Department
set up a dashboard for taxpayers to monitor which borrowers were doing the
best job paying back public funds. TARP Tracker from November 2008 to March
2020, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/reports/Pages/TARP-Tracker.aspx (last updated July 2, 2015, 9:43
AM).
57. The Commissioner of the SEC’s investigations and enforcement
activities, along with reasonable self-regulation of the securities industry, forms
the backbone of the American system of securities regulation. See William L.
Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 246 (1963)
(describing industry’s preference for, and reliance upon, self-policing as first
line of defense against misbehavior).
58. Id.
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their shareholders performed worse during the crisis”59 and others
found CEOs heavily incentivized to return capital to shareholders
took more risk.60
Despite the scarcity of evidence that CEO pay mattered much
in firm performance, even when disclosed in detail and subjected to
unprecedented scrutiny, the journalists and populists61 at the
palace gates continued to call for blood.62 One of the ideas proposed
at the time – to report CEO pay as a multiple of median worker pay
at the same firm – was part of a move to scrutinize the governance
of TARP bailed-out firms that gained traction and made its way into
a later version of Dodd-Frank.63 This provision has no basis in
either economics or finance, and little grounding in the corporate
governance literature.64 Instead, like the Secretaries of State
reporting from birth certificate records its most popular baby names
each calendar year,65 it is merely a source of low-hanging fruit for
opportunistic slow-news-day journalism.
Even if one believes it is relevant to report CEO pay decisions
in more detail, it is completely unclear why one would then also
59. See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and
the Credit Crisis 1, 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15212, 2009), www.nber.org/papers/w15212.pdf.
60. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257,
257 (2010). But see Steven N. Kaplan, “Should Banker Pay Be Regulated?”
ECONOMIST’S VOICE, Dec. 2009, at 1, 2 (calling into question results of Cheng,
Hong, and Scheinkman as “results . . . largely driven by insurance firms”).
61. Susanna Kim, Pressure on SEC to Implement Rule Disclosing CEO to
Median Worker Pay, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012), www.abcnews.go.com/Busin
ess/sec-pressured-implement-ceo-worker-pay-disclosurewalmarts/story?id=15886752.
62. A.Q. Smith, It’s Basically Just Immoral to be Rich, CURRENT AFFAIRS,
Jun. 14, 2017, at 27, www.currentaffairs.org/2017/06/its-basically-just-immo
ral-to-be-rich.
63. It is unclear when these conversations occurred. They likely occurred in
the first half of 2010, as these ideas of including governance and the
relationship between the Board of Directors and the CEO first appear in a
conference report from the House of Representatives in late June of that year.
H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 549-50 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
64. See generally Duane E. Mitchell et al., The Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule
and Stakeholder Pressures May Give Way to Lower CEO Compensation: A
Literary Approach, 3 J. MGMT. SCI. & BUS. INTELLIGENCE 47 (2018); Steven
Balsam et al., What Explains the CEO-Worker Pay Ratios?: Evidence on the
Effects of National Culture and Institutions Around the World (July 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), www.fmaconferences.org/Vegas/Papers/What_expla
ins_the_CEO_worker_pay_ratios_Evidence_on_the_effects_of_national_cultur
e_governance_and_equity_orientation_around_the_world.pdf; Biagio Marino,
Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for
Effective Executive Compensation Reform, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1355 (2016).
65. See generally Sonja Haller, Find Out the Most Popular Girl Baby Names
in Your State, USA TODAY (May 20, 2019), www.usatoday.com/story/life/
allthemoms/2019/05/19/most-popular-girl-baby-names-2018-yourstate/3734413002 (reporting a list of popular baby names since the 1950s from
information drawn from the Secretary of State’s data).
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believe that the CEO’s pay described as a multiple of the firm’s
median worker’s pay is relevant,66 and those arguing in favor of the
ratio’s relevance routinely underappreciate the complexity of
assembling the figure.67 Not only is this an arbitrary measure not
used by any administrators, agencies, or regulators, it is a
particularly non-trans-sector-portable metric.68 The CEO of
Walmart will earn a higher multiple of the median Walmart
worker’s salary not because Walmart is a greedier or worse-run
business than Google, but because Google’s median employee is far
more likely to be a computer scientist or engineer rather than a
forklift operator. These differences in median-worker-pay-to-CEOpay are evidence of precisely one thing: that Walmart and Google
are in different businesses. Is a firm whose CEO accepts lower pay
better-run, or has it merely hired a less talented CEO, or an
already-very-wealthy CEO? There are many ways to move toward
finding answers to these valid questions, but the Dodd-Frank
Section 953(b) ratio is a rudderless idea drifting in the opposite
direction.

V. NOTES ON USEFULNESS OF EXECUTIVE PAY
DISCLOSURES, PARTICULARLY INTER-FIRM
It was not until half a decade after the financial crisis that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) finally implemented
the enhanced reporting proposed and described in Section 953(b).69
And, when it did occur, it occurred with not-inconsequential
disagreement over how it would be instituted.70 Many attorneys,
66. And, conversely, what does the opposite ratio tell one about the median
worker’s job performance? If he or she is truly making 1/100th the contribution
made by the CEO, is that firm wrong to have a 100:1 CEO pay ratio? Luis
Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, The CEO Pay Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution for
Both Issuers and Investors (Aug. 5, 2015), www.sec.gov/news/statement/
statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html (making this point and
similar points from the Author’s rule commentary to the SEC).
67. Dover, for instance, maintains 110 separate payrolls and 129 unique
benefit and retirement plans. See Becky Yerak, Corporate Pay Ratio Plan
Proves Divisive, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2014) (providing excerpt written by Ivonne
Cabrera, Dover Corporation’s general counsel, to SEC).
68. 80 Fed. Reg. 50,109 n.45 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 240, 249) (citing this Author’s concerns over the proposed rule and noting
the proposed rule to report CEO pay ratios could “decrease the ratio’s utility
(especially for comparing the ratios of different companies)”).
69. Compare H.R. 4173, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173enr
/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173enr.pdf (including final text of Dodd-Frank and passed
from committee to floor July 21, 2010), with Aguilar, supra note 66, and Press
Release, supra note 11
70. This disagreement is showcased in the 287,000 comment letters showing
sentiment ranging from enthusiasm to anger stored in file S7-07-13 and alluded
to in the Commissioner Aguilar’s statement on the open meeting on the topic.
See Aguilar, supra note 66 (“The diverse views expressed by these commenters
reflect that Congress tasked the Commission with navigating a highly divisive
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former regulators, and professors commented on possible solutions
for implementing Section 953(b), including the author of this
Article.71 Later that year, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar would
announce the SEC’s implementation decision.72 Effective October
19, 2015, the SEC began to enforce the final implementation73 of
Section 953(b), which had directed the Commission to amend Item
402 of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of the median of the
annual total compensation of all employees of a registrant minus a
chief executive officer and the ratio of the median of the annual total
compensation of all employees to the annual total compensation of
that chief executive officer. According to the SEC’s guidance to
registered publicly-traded companies, “[t]he disclosure is required
in any annual report, proxy or information statement, or
registration statement that requires executive compensation
disclosure pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K.”74
One problem with the design as implemented is that flexibility
in the scheme – particularly flexibility that makes the reporting
sympathetic to other unusual accounting practices that are firmspecific – substantially impairs the consistency of reporting
between firms (and, hence, the ease with which investors can
compare industries or firms’ remuneration practices75). Hence,
while this reporting latitude may allow for firm-specific precision
and nuance, it hobbles investors’ attempts at comparisons. Take, for
instance, the reporting of Doug McMillon’s $22,800,000 pay as CEO
of Walmart in a recent year versus the median Walmart worker’s
pay of $19,177 during that same year, a ratio of 1,188:1.76 If one
reclassifies this in terms of time, Mr. McMillon makes $62,637.36
per day and makes as much as the company’s median employee
makes per year during a good night’s sleep (7.35 hours). Meanwhile,
aerospace, defense, and engineering firm Lockheed-Martin in the
same year, Marillyn Hewson earned an almost-identical amount to
Mr. McMillon at Walmart: $22,915,200.77 But the median non-CEO
employee at Lockheed-Martin earned $123,200 that year (making
subject—a boon or a bane, depending on one’s perspective.”).
71. Letter from Karl T. Muth to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Sept. 24, 2013), www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-29.htm.
72. See Aguilar, supra note 66 (citing Karl T. Muth’s comments).
73. See 17 C.F.R. § § 229, 249 as clarified in Release Nos. 33-9877, 34-75610,
and in File No. S7-07-13 (2015) (amending and largely replacing earlier drafts).
74. 17 C.F.R. § § 229, 249 with reference to Release No. 33-9877 (2015)
(creating final language for 2015 consideration, some of which would later be
subject to SEC interpretation in 2018 and 2019).
75. See supra note 67.
76. Financial Information, WALMART, www.stock.walmart.com/invest
ors/financial-information/sec-filings (last visited Aug. 7, 2020) (exhibiting all of
Walmart’s SEC filings for recent years).
77. SEC Filings, LOCKHEED MARTIN, www.investors.lockheedmartin.com/
financial-information/sec-filings (last visited Aug. 7, 2020) (exhibiting all of
Lockheed Martin’s SEC filings for recent years). The year referenced is 20182019.
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the CEO pay ratio 186:1).78 The ratio of 186:1 is about six and a half
times lower than 1,188:1; does this mean Lockheed-Martin is 6.5
times better run, that Lockheed-Martin is 6.5 times more
conservative in its pay, or that the twenty-two million paid to Ms.
Hewson is 6.5 times more reasonable than the same amount paid to
Mr. McMillon? The 6.5 ratio may mean something, but probably
does not mean any of these things.
Which naturally invites the question: Do investors care about
this issue? The answer seems to be “no.”79
When Larry Merlo, as CEO of CVS Health Group, was paid 434
times the salary of the median CVS employee in 2015 (then the
largest such ratio ever reported in the Fortune 500), the issue was
not raised on the earnings call, in either of the follow-ups to the
earnings call, in any shareholder questions submitted
contemporaneous with the disclosure, or in any addenda to CVS’s
Form 4,80 8-K,81 S-8,82 Proxy Statements (DEF 14A),83 or securities
statements during that period (e.g. CVS’s S-3).84 Nor was the
growth of Mr. Merlo’s compensation as CEO questioned.85 Five
years later (the most recent information available at the time of this
writing), Mr. Merlo now earns 618 times more than the median nonCEO CVS employee – but by CVS’s calculation makes a similar
annual amount to what Mr. McMillon and Ms. Hewson make: $21.9
million.86 On CVS’s most recent earnings call with analysts and
78. Id.
79. Tomi Kilgore, CEO Pay Ratio Disclosures Provide Little More Than Noise
for Investors, MARKET WATCH (May 28, 2018), www.marketwatch.com/story/
ceo-pay-ratios-provide-little-more-than-noise-for-investors-2018-04-20
(“’Bottom line, it’s not telling us any more about income inequality that we
didn’t already know,’ Marcec [of Equilar] said.”).
80. CVS Health, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities
(Form 4) (Nov. 6, 2015), www.investors.cvshealth.com/investors/sec-filings/secfilings-details/default.aspx?FilingId=10995244.
81. CVS Health, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 16, 2015), www.inv
estors.cvshealth.com/investors/sec-filings/sec-filingsdetails/default.aspx?FilingId=11063916 (last accessed May 3, 2020).
82. CVS Health, Registration Statement (Form S-8) (Dec. 30, 2015),
www.investors.cvshealth.com/investors/sec-filings/sec-filingsdetails/default.aspx?FilingId=11084848.
83. Omnicare, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (May 21,
2015), www.investors.cvshealth.com/investors/sec-filings/sec-filings-details/def
ault.aspx?FilingId=10718708.
84. CVS Health, Registration Statement (Form S-3) (June 23, 2015),
www.investors.cvshealth.com/investors/sec-filings/sec-filingsdetails/default.aspx?FilingId=10772597.
85. In 2013, Merlo earned $12.1 million, or 422 times the earnings of CVS’s
median non-CEO worker, which were $28,700. David Lazarus, Executive Pay is
an Insult to Working Families, L. A. TIMES (May 26, 2014), www.latimes.com
/business/la-fi-lazarus-20140527-column.html.
86. With new option grants and accounting for the current-year contribution
value of participation in various programs and grants made available to Mr.
Merlo in prior pay packages, this amount climbs to $36.5 million and the pay
ratio climbs to 790 from 618. CVS Health CEO’s 2019 Total Compensation Was
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investors,87 no CVS employee’s pay was mentioned – including Mr.
Merlo’s (or, for that matter, the pay of the median non-CEO
worker). Rather than the mere millions paid to Merlo during the
past year, people were understandably more interested in hearing
about the billions returned to shareholders by CVS.88

VI. CONCLUSION
While well-intentioned, Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank does
little to give investors new, interesting, actionable information with
which to make better decisions. The groundwork of Section 953(b)
was laid during the financial crisis, and it was admirable for
regulators and legislators to want to give shareholders the same
transparency and reporting rigor they enjoyed as to TARP firms.
However, the result achieved by Section 953(b) benefits from
neither the resolution nor the context of that intense reporting
during TARP.
The ratio of pay between the CEO and the median non-CEO
employee neither indicates whether the CEO is overpaid, nor
whether governance mechanisms are well-functioning (or
malfunctioning), nor whether the CEO is well-incentivized to do
what is in shareholders’ best interests. It creates a metric that is
neither useful longitudinally (comparing different years at the same
company) or market- or sector-wide (between companies)89 while
creating an accounting headache at each company.
Finally, Section 953(b)’s effect is one of societal demoralization
through the language and messages of financial stratification. In
practice, Section 953(b) requires the accounting, compliance, and
legal departments of large companies to set aside many hours each
year90 during which each company is expected to manufacture a few
weapons to be used in class warfare, a few pitchforks and pikes to
be waved menacingly in their executives’ general direction.
$36.5 Million, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/brief-cvshealth-ceos-2019-total-compens/brief-cvs-health-ceos-2019-total-compensationwas-36-5-million-idUSFWN2BR1E4.
87. CVS Health Corp (CVS) Q4 2019 Earnings Call Transcript, MOTLEY
FOOL (Feb. 12, 2020, 12:30 PM), www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/
2020/02/12/cvs-health-corp-cvs-q4-2019-earnings-call-transcri.aspx.
88. More than $2.6 billion. See Dividend History, CVS HEALTH,
www.investors.cvshealth.com/investors/stock-information/dividendhistory/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 6, 2020) (displaying recent dividend
payout history of CVS).
89. See Theo Francis & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Are You Underpaid? In a First,
U.S. Firms Reveal How Much They Pay Workers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2018),
www.wsj.com/articles/are-you-underpaid-in-a-first-u-s-firms-reveal-how-muchthey-pay-workers-1520766000 (“[C]omparisons between companies can be
tricky.”).
90. See, e.g., Yerak, supra note 67 (“Given the administrative complexity of
Dover's global operations, Dover estimates that its annual cost to collect
required data would exceed $2 million under the proposed rules.”).
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953(b) disclosures may tell a story. That story is not
informative; instead, it is needlessly provocative.
Five years passed between Dodd-Frank (2010) and the SEC’s
adoption of a pay ratio disclosure rule now commonly referred to as
Section 953(b) in 2015.91 Now, a further five years later, investors
are no better-informed, CEOs are no more precisely compensated,
Boards of Directors behave similarly, and employees are no betteroff. Instead, the winners in Section 953(b) are the consultants,
public relations firms, outside accounting firms, and outside law
firms that have billed untold hours advising companies on the care
and feeding of a regulatory hound bred to have an annoying bark
and an inconsequential bite.

91. Press Release, supra note 11.
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Table A92

92. Boeing Co., supra note 21, at 18. A typical Director Compensation Table
from the director pay disclosures provided by publicly-traded companies in the
United States. Footnotes clarify roles and any tenure-related adjustments in
pay.
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Table B93

93. Boeing Co., supra note 21, at 27. A typical Executive Compensation
Table from the executive pay disclosures provided by a publicly-traded company
in its occasional and ordinary reporting to shareholders.
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Table C94

94. Ryan Tracy et al., supra note 35, at A9 (describing through histogram
the posture of TARP firms in 2014).

